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ABSTRACT The declaration of the influenza A (H1N1) epidemic in late April 2009 in 
Mexico was followed by a series of criticisms and to a lesser degree shows of support of 
the measures applied and of the manner of operation of the Mexican health system. In 
this text, I attempt to explain, using materials published in medical journals and in the 
Mexican press, the technical and ideological assumptions behind the work undertaken 
by the health sector as well as the assumptions behind the criticisms received. This ex-
ploration has two complementary objectives: first, to understand why the Mexican health 
sector acted the way it did; and second, to consider the technical legitimacy of the ac-
tions developed by the health sector and of the criticisms made regarding those actions.
KEY WORDS Influenza A Virus, H1N1 Subtype; Press; Scientific Communication and 
Diffusion; International Agencies; National Strategies; National Health Systems; Mexico.
RESUMEN Declarada a fines de abril de 2009 la epidemia de influenza A (H1N1) en 
México, se realizaron toda una serie de críticas y en menor grado de apoyos respecto 
de las medidas aplicadas y de la forma de operar del sector salud mexicano. En este 
texto trato de explicitar, a través de materiales publicados en revistas médicas y en la 
prensa mexicana, cuáles son los presupuestos técnicos e ideológicos con que trabajó el 
sector salud y cuáles son los manejados por los críticos. Esto se realiza con dos objetivos 
complementarios: primero, tratar de entender por qué actuó como actuó el sector salud 
mexicano y, segundo, para observar la legitimidad técnica de las acciones que desarrolló 
dicho sector y de las críticas que se hicieron a dichas acciones. 
PALABRAS CLAVES Subtipo H1N1 del Virus de la Influenza A; Prensa; Comunicación 
y Divulgación Científica; Organismos Internacionales; Estrategias Nacionales; Sistemas 
Nacionales de Salud; México.
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Near the end of April 2009, Mexico 
declared a health alert owing to the rise of a new 
strain of influenza that was showing epidemic 
characteristics and which, in a few days, would be 
called A (H1N1). The Mexican government and the 
health sector immediately put into action a number 
of preventive measures unprecedented in Mexico. 
Such measures meant the shutting down of schools 
at all three educational levels, cinemas, theaters, 
soccer stadiums, Catholic mass, restaurants and 
other service establishments for almost three 
weeks. The declaration of the epidemic; the 
supposed delay in informing the Mexican public, 
the World Health Organization (WHO) and its 
member countries; the high number of deaths 
incorrectly attributed to the new influenza; and 
the preventive measures themselves, were 
strongly criticized, largely by the mass media and 
to a lesser extent, by biomedical research studies, 
to the point at which it was possible to consider 
that the new pandemic did not exist but rather 
was merely a media event. Moreover, constant 
criticism was aimed at the way the official health 
sector informed the population, with accusations 
that the sector was hiding data, exaggerating the 
problem and driving an alarmist campaign for 
political and economic reasons. Criticism also 
stressed the lack of organization of the health 
sector, the lack of coordination between the federal 
and state levels, and the lack of planning regarding 
both the measures taken as well as the way the 
population was informed of the characteristics and 
consequences of the new influenza (1). 
Facing this criticism, the Secretariat of 
Health, the WHO and the Pan-American Health 
Organization (PAHO) defended the actions taken 
by Mexico by way of technical arguments which 
gave rise to a strong polarization between those 
questioning and those supporting the measures 
taken by the Mexican health sector. These 
discussions involved public health professionals, 
high-ranking officials from the Mexican health 
sector and from international organizations, 
representatives of critical social medicine, and great 
variety of intellectuals whose opinions about 
issues – such as the new influenza – circulated 
through the press, especially during the first four 
weeks, issues that up to that point had not been 
of much interest to them, at least according to 
what can be gleaned from their publications (a).
METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS
In this work I will attempt to put into 
evidence, through the use of material published 
by the press and Mexican medical journals, the 
technical and ideological assumptions employed 
by the health sector, and those employed by 
the critics. My work has two complementary 
objectives: firstly, to try to understand why the 
Mexican health sector acted the way it did and, 
secondly, to observe the technical legitimacy of 
the actions taken by the health sector and the 
criticisms of those actions. Our analysis is based 
on information on influenza A (H1N1) published 
by the newspapers La Jornada and Reforma 
between 2009 and 2013, and on specific material 
published by 28 Mexican biomedical journals 
between 2009 and 2012.
The study entailed carrying out the following 
activities: a) description and analysis of all the 
headlines and sublines appearing on the front 
pages of the newspapers La Jornada and Reforma 
between April 23, 2009 and May 18, 2009 
regarding influenza A (H1N1); b) description 
and analysis of a sample of news articles by 
both newspapers about the new influenza 
published between April 23, 2009 and July 31, 
2009; c) review of the information on influenza 
A (H1N1) published by Reforma and La Jornada 
between August 1, 2009 and July 31, 2013; d) 
collection of all articles on influenza A (H1N1) 
published on 28 Mexican biomedical journals 
between 2009 and 2011: e) review of two 
opinion magazines published between 2009 and 
2011; and f) review of articles about influenza 
A (H1N1) published internationally between 
2009 and 2013. In addition, we used material 
on influenza published between 2000 and 2008 
in ten Mexican newspapers which was part of 
previous research. In this text, specific citations of 
the biomedical texts analyzed and the newspaper 
articles published by La Jornada and Reforma are 
given. This work is the product of a research study 
currently underway regarding the written press 
and influenza A (H1N1) (1).
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WHY DID THE HEALTH SECTOR ACT THE 
WAY IT DID? SOME ASSUMPTIONS
Negative criticism and unconditional shows 
of support aside, we have to reflect on why the 
official health sector acted the way it did. That 
is, reflect not only on whether the actions were 
right or wrong, but also on the following: What 
was the technical and ideological rationality 
that guided the way it intervened? What was it 
seeking with these recommendations and actions? 
Why did it use alarmism, not only through social 
representations but also through practices which 
could have had – and indeed did have – severe 
economic and social consequences? Why did it 
continue to insist on the dangers and the need for 
prevention even once there was certainty of the 
mild severity of the virus in terms of mortality?
I consider that these and other questions can 
be answered through the material published in 
biomedical journals and, above all, through the 
opinions of the different social actors that appear 
in the media, that is, the Mexican health sector, the 
health sector of several countries and especially 
that of the US, the WHO and the PAHO, the critical 
public health professionals that acknowledge the 
existence of the problem and those who consider 
it as a fabrication, the pharmaceutical-chemical 
industry – which was implicated by that possible 
“fabrication” – and other social actors, including 
the Mexican government.
From the type of press material and 
biomedical journals we have consulted, we can 
define two groups of social actors through which 
we can analyze the assumptions held to confront, 
explain, criticize or defend the work undertaken 
by the health sector. Indeed, one group is formed 
by those who were in charge of dealing with the 
problem and solving it, which I will call health 
sector, and another group by those who questioned 
some aspects or radically distrusted not only the 
work undertaken, but also the very existence of 
the problem, which I will call critics (b).
In the case of the rationality applied by 
the official health sector, and especially the 
preventive sector, we have to highlight a whole 
series of assumptions that operate in a system of 
representations and technical practices which, for 
the most part – and I stress this – do not appear as 
certainties but as possibilities. We assume that the 
theoretical and empirical presuppositions stated 
below constitute the basis for the work undertaken 
by the Mexican Secretariat of Health.
Since at least the 1980s, infectious and 
contagious diseases have taken on a new 
significance, not only in the peripheral countries, 
where they have always had prominence, but 
also in the developed world owing to HIV/
AIDS and, more recently, with the resurgence 
of sexually transmitted diseases and broncho-
pulmonary tuberculosis. Furthermore, at the 
beginning of 2000, the WHO warned of the future 
danger of approximately thirty new infectious 
and contagious diseases that could develop 
worldwide, which began to be confirmed in 
2002 and 2003 with the appearance of the Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), and between 
2003 and 2005, when avian influenza became a 
primary global concern. We have also witnessed 
in several contexts the resurgence of cholera and 
yellow fever, and a notable spread of dengue fever, 
including the hemorrhagic strain. Epidemiologists 
foresee an alarming future, since global warming 
could increase the recurrence and spread of these 
diseases.
Influenza, in turn, is known to be “the most 
common respiratory viral infection in humans 
[...] it is the most pathogenic respiratory virus, so 
it poses a major problem for public health” (2 p. 
196). It is also assumed that the new strains will be 
more lethal and resistant, and that it is difficult to 
predict when the new pandemic will occur since 
“once the influenza pandemics start, history has 
proven them to be uncontainable” (3 p. 294). For 
this reason, the primary assumption possibly lies 
in the epidemiological expectation that at any 
time – though we do not know exactly when – a 
great lethal pandemic will occur, with historical 
reference to the so-called “Spanish Influenza,” but 
which feeds from more recent processes, such 
as those previously mentioned. Thus, in several 
articles of the analyzed newspapers, it is remarked 
in connection with influenza A (H1N1) that 
“when the new strain arose [...] in spring, experts 
feared that it could follow the pattern of the 1918 
influenza, the most lethal epidemic in the world. 
This strain also appeared in spring as a relatively 
mild virus, but reappeared in a more lethal form in 
autumn” (4). It is even asserted that said pandemic, 
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which “caused the death of tens of millions of 
people, first appeared in a mild form and then 
reappeared six months later with a more lethal 
result” (5). But it is also noted that the appearance 
of the new virus “happened right at the moment 
when scientists were looking suspiciously at the 
changes in the behavior observed in another virus, 
the strain of avian influenza A (H5N1) in Egypt” 
(6), which is why the occurrence of the influenza 
A (H1N1) surprised not only the Mexican health 
sector, but also the principal international 
specialists.
Thus, this appraisal expressed not only 
the view of the media, but also what specialists 
of Mexico and another countries expected 
and continue to expect (7-16): “In his recent 
remarks […] Dr. Lee Jong-Wook […] warned 
all the attending Ministers of Health from the 
Americas [gathered in Washington, DC] of the 
risk of a threat with incalculable health, social and 
economic consequences, stating that ‘failure to 
take this threat [of a possible pandemic] seriously 
and prepare appropriately will have catastrophic 
consequences’” (17 p.1). For this reason, “PAHO/
WHO authorities have exhorted the countries of 
the region to prepare for the possible emergence 
of a new strain of influenza capable of producing a 
pandemic” (17 p.1). One year before the outbreak 
of the Influenza A (H1N1), a key Mexican specialist 
maintained that “the scenarios presented here and 
international recommendations leave no room for 
doubt that we must continue to prepare ourselves 
to face the next pandemic [...] Taubenberger has 
stated in a number of forums that the clock of 
the pandemic is ticking but no one knows what 
hour it shows; there is no time to waste in light 
of this uncertainty, and the inevitability that it 
will occur” (18 p.290). Furthermore, once the 
epidemic caused by the new influenza broke out, 
and despite its low lethality, Mexican specialists 
concluded that “the risk of the development of 
a pandemic caused by the avian influenza virus 
is still latent. This pandemic [A (H1N1)] is likely 
serving as a simulation or trial for a pandemic 
caused by a more lethal virus” (19 p.73).
Between 2010 and 2013 the media and 
specialists continued informing of and investigating 
the possibilities of a severe pandemic which, 
during 2012 and 2013, was posed regarding 
influenza A-H7N9 and Middle East Respiratory 
Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV). The effects of 
climate change raise concern as the possible cause 
of pandemics, and it is assumed that although it is 
possible to estimate what may occur in peripheral 
countries, and especially in Africa, it is not clear 
how to face the situation.
It is important to note that, when “abnormal” 
respiratory episodes occurred during March 2009, 
the Secretariat of Health was aware that “in the 
event of an influenza pandemic, 25 percent of 
the population could be affected, principally in 
developing countries whose health systems are 
still deficient” (20). What is more, days before 
declaring the epidemic, the Secretary of Health 
stated that an influenza epidemic “could cause up 
to one million deaths in only two or three months, 
so we have to be prepared” (21).
It was according to these assumptions “that 
Mexico started to prepare for a possible pandemic 
in 2003, with a response plan and a strategic stock 
of medicines, among other actions” (22). This 
plan was reported in the media at its inception 
and, in early November 2005, the Secretary of 
Health “informed that the president was recently 
presented with the National Preparation and 
Response Plan for an influenza pandemic” (23). 
The new president at the beginning of the next 
six-year presidential period affirmed that “Mexico 
is prepared to face an influenza pandemic” (24). 
The new Secretary of Health similarly affirmed in 
late December of that year that “Mexico is prepared 
in the event of an influenza epidemic outbreak” 
(25). He reiterated this in March 2009, stating that 
“Mexico has made a commitment with the WHO, 
so that at most 72 hours after identifying any case 
of fever of unknown origin, the national health 
system can provide information regarding the 
case and take the actions needed to avoid health 
disturbances” (20), as in 2007 all WHO member 
countries agreed that any new disease that could 
spread around the globe must be immediately 
reported to the international organization. That 
is, the Mexican political and technical authorities 
had agreed to the WHO regulations, and also 
maintained that Mexico was prepared to face a 
highly expected epidemic.
Epidemiologists hold technical assumptions 
regarding the time of the year when influenza 
occurs, as well as regarding the fact that every 
influenza pandemic is characterized by a series 
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of waves of increasing severity. And it was, in 
part, this last assumption which supported the 
continuity of the implementation of preventive 
measures, in spite of the drop in the number of 
cases that was being observed during June and July 
2009. At different moments, national and foreign 
experts predicted a second wave, which would be 
“more severe than that of the previous months, as 
the new virus is threatening and unpredictable, 
warned Margaret Chan, Director-General of the 
WHO” (26), whereas a team from the Faculty of 
Sciences of the Universidad Nacional Autónoma 
de México (UNAM) stated that “the epidemic 
will reach its peak between next October and 
November, when the confirmed number of cases 
of Influenza A (H1N1) could double” (27). What is 
more, “according to a mathematical model of the 
WHO, if the A (H1N1) virus becomes pandemic, 
the world could face three waves of influenza, 
affecting more strongly the less developed and 
worst equipped countries. The impact of such a 
pandemic would be variable since a virus that 
causes only mild illness in some countries with 
robust health systems can become devastating in 
those countries with weak health care institutions 
and lack of medicines” (5). These consequences are 
confirmed by Mexican experts: “The experience 
with previous pandemics has taught us that second 
waves can be worse than first waves, causing more 
deaths due to the adaptation of the virus to grow 
efficiently in humans, and to the possible increase 
in virulence caused by mutations generated during 
its replication in humans” (28 p.23).
The potential danger of the new virus 
lies, on the one hand, in the lack of knowledge 
regarding several of its main characteristics, 
and, on the other, in the acknowledgement of 
the high contagiousness of swine influenza, 
and the fact that it is transmitted from person 
to person. Furthermore, “the concern of WHO 
and consulted experts is based on the fact that 
the virus in question, which has been identified 
as A (H1N1) strain, has unprecedented specific 
characteristics [...] with a gene mutation never 
found before” (29); which constituted an initially 
decisive fact, since the new influenza could not 
be differentiated clinically from the seasonal 
influenza. Furthermore, influenza viruses have 
certain characteristics that deeply concern 
specialists, such as the appearance approximately 
every ten years of “a more aggressive mutation, 
and depending on the conditions, epidemic 
outbreaks, local epidemics or threats of pandemic 
like we are experiencing today can occur” (30). 
What is more, “influenza viruses mutate constantly 
and in an unpredictable way, therefore we can 
not discard the possibility of a more virulent and 
potentially antibiotic-resistant virus appearing,” 
stated a WHO specialist (5). Indeed, “‘we have 
every reason to be concerned about interactions of 
the new H1N1 virus with other viruses,’ explained 
M. Chan, Director-General of the WHO. ‘We 
must never forget that the H5N1 avian influenza 
virus is now firmly established in poultry in several 
countries. No one can say how this avian virus 
will behave when pressured by large numbers of 
people infected with the new H1N1 virus,’ added 
Chan” (31).
Now then, specialists know that while type 
B and C influenza viruses are fairly stabilized 
and are unlikely to cause a lethal pandemic, type 
A influenza viruses are capable of producing a 
demographic catastrophe. Type A influenza viruses 
“are responsible for most epidemics, and are the 
only type that can cause pandemics” (32). It is a 
virus type characterized by permanent change; its 
genes constantly recombine, and “approximately 
in each human generation, a version of type A 
influenza residing in birds or swine combines its 
genes with a type of human influenza or acquires 
mutations that allow it to cross the species barrier” 
(8 p.25). According to the Secretariat of Health, 
the new virus turned out to be a “biological 
cocktail,” with a combination of genetic material 
that had never been reported among influenza 
viruses known in the US or in any other part of the 
world. “The new viral variant, now known as 2009 
Influenza A (H1N1), was immediately associated 
with a series of severe cases of atypical pneumonia 
occurring in our country since March, which 
led to the declaration of national emergency on 
April 23” (33 p.10). Although it was subsequently 
observed that the new virus had low lethality, 
the alert continued for several months because of 
– among other reasons – the speed at which the 
virus spread; while in the previous epidemics of 
1918 and 1976 it had taken the virus more than 
six months to spread, it took the new virus only 
one month and a half, which further increased the 
epidemiologists’ concern.
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Certain characteristics of the new virus 
challenged the expectations of public health 
professionals, since the new virus was not 
expected to emerge during the months in which 
it appeared: “For this reason, weeks went by 
before physicians, epidemiologists and some 
epidemiological surveillance systems detected 
unusual behavior in the number and severity of 
acute respiratory diseases” (33 p.15). Neither 
was it expected that the greatest incidence would 
occur in older children and young adults, as for 
epidemiologists and clinicians “the populations 
most vulnerable to influenza are children under 
5 and people over 65” (34). This assumption is so 
strong that those who were most affected during 
the whole period of the pandemic alert were never 
considered a risk group; only those groups already 
established as at risk by the empirical assumptions 
of the health sector continued to be considered 
as such. 
Furthermore, the Secretariat of Health did not 
expect the epidemic to occur in Mexico. The fact 
that during the first weeks only Mexicans seemed 
to be dying despite the strong presence of the virus 
in countries such as the US has also had an impact. 
Furthermore, as we have already mentioned, the 
WHO, the PAHO, specialized global research 
centers, and not just Mexican specialists, 
expected an avian influenza epidemic instead of 
the influenza A (H1N1), which initially caused 
confusion and uncertainty: “It had always been 
thought that the origin of the pandemic would lie 
in a new human virus of avian origin, and that this 
virus would come from the Asian continent, since 
it was being affected by the A (H5N1) strain of the 
avian influenza which had already infected more 
than 450 people and had a lethality rate higher 
than 60%. Nevertheless, although international 
experts had such an expectation, the possibility 
that the new pandemic could emerge from other 
strains, as was the case of A (H1N1), was never 
discarded” (33,35 p.158).
We consider that – at least in part – 
the observations made by intellectuals and 
professionals in the Mexican press (c) seem to 
consider medical knowledge and the health sector 
in particular as eternal conspirators or as if this 
sector and the medical sciences had or should 
have an almost complete scientific certainty, 
when in fact, what prevails at the clinical as well 
as epidemiological level, and especially in light of 
critical events like a new influenza, is uncertainty: 
“In the study of emergence or re-emergence of 
diseases there is always a factor of uncertainty, 
principally caused by the role of chance in the 
adaptive changes of infectious agents. Currently, 
the question regarding the possibility of influenza 
A (H1N1) becoming more virulent, as it did in the 
subsequent waves of the 1918 pandemic, remains 
open” (36 p.439).
As we know, chance is not the only element 
related to this uncertainty, but also medical 
knowledge itself, the characteristics of biomedical 
institutions, and the politico-economic and 
ideological processes in which context the 
epidemic appears and the medical institutions 
operate (37,38). Therefore, the health sector 
knows the difficulties medical knowledge has 
in the clinical identification and detection of the 
new influenza, but specialists also know about 
the limitations of the preventive measures to be 
applied, especially when there are no specific 
vaccines: “[Social distancing] measures will have 
limited effectiveness in stopping human infections 
once the pandemic begins, but they may be of 
use in helping to slow the pandemic’s spread” (39 
p.9). Although personal hygiene is a major factor 
in reducing the propagation of influenzas, “it is 
not known how effective this guidance would be 
in slowing the spread of a pandemic” (39 p.9). 
On the other hand, epidemiologists continue to 
discuss the usefulness of quarantines; while they 
were used successfully in several countries to “stop 
the spread of SARS,” some specialists maintain “it 
is not clear how effective they will prove to be 
in the battle against swine flu [...] as in the case 
of China ‘there’s quite a bit of controversy about 
whether these methods actually helped,’ states 
Dick Thompson, spokesman for the WHO” (40).
An almost determining factor in the way 
the Secretariat of Health and the WHO faced 
the epidemic was the fact that the virus was new 
and the most efficient preventive strategy was not 
available, that is, there was not initially a specific 
vaccine: “Experts are certain that the influenza 
pandemic will emerge at any time, and the problem 
is that only then, when the type of virus that causes 
the disease is known, will it be possible to develop 
a vaccine” (41). Since it was anticipated that the 
vaccine would only be available approximately 
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six months after the pandemic first broke out, this 
deficiency increased concern regarding the effects 
of the new influenza. Furthermore, the health 
sector knows, and does not ignore, the possible 
consequences of the administration of vaccines, 
especially the appearance of Guillain Barré 
Syndrome; it is also aware that once the vaccine is 
ready, it will be unequally distributed among rich 
and poor countries, since “the richest countries in 
the world dominate the supply of vaccines” (42 
p.122).
The WHO, the PAHO and also the Mexican 
health sector are all aware of this: “Unfortunately, 
only a few countries have an industrial 
pharmaceutical capacity to manufacture this new 
vaccine on the required scale” (43 p.476). This 
author highlights that manufacturing companies 
have commitments and agreements with their 
own countries first, and then with other countries. 
Indeed, Mexican authorities expected to receive 
the vaccine before the beginning of the 2009-2010 
winter season, and this expectation was not met.
The health sector assumes that vaccines 
should be administered to the groups considered 
at risk, the first of which is health personnel for two 
basic reasons: the health personnel that contract 
the disease may transmit it to their patients, 
especially to those who are most vulnerable; 
and also, new influenza can cause disability, 
absenteeism and contagion among colleagues. For 
this reason, as we will see later, the percentage of 
health personnel that refused to be vaccinated was 
noteworthy.
If we do not have a specific vaccine, the 
health sector assumes that at least we have some 
antivirals that have proven effective. Studies 
published in Nature (44) and Science (45) 
“suggest that if effective antivirals are rushed to the 
region in which a pandemic strain first emerges, 
coupled with certain public health measures, that 
it may be possible to contain it before it spreads 
worldwide” (39,46). Therefore, the WHO advised 
the countries with economic capacity to keep a 
stock of antivirals, and continued to advise them 
to do so in 2012 and 2013 in the light of the new 
viral threats.
Moreover, public health professionals know 
that the capacity of response to a new pandemic 
virus is limited, not only because of the lack of 
a specific vaccine and the limited effectiveness of 
antivirals, but also because there is no capacity 
for care and hospitalization in the event of an 
epidemic: “The conclusion here is resounding: 
there is no country in the world with the hospital 
infrastructure and the staff required to attend to 
all the cases of influenza that could occur” (14 
p.472, 18). But they also know that the economic 
investments of the Mexican health sector are 
neither directed to primary health care nor to the 
treatment of infectious and contagious diseases, 
but to tertiary health care and chronic degenerative 
diseases.
All the facts and assumptions here described 
motivated the WHO and the Secretary of Health to 
rally themselves and take immediate action, since 
“speed is important [...] time is pressing because 
the disease is spreading geographically, with 
three different foci in Mexico” (29). It is crucial 
to detect the cases early and take immediate 
action for curative and preventive reasons, 
because according to the director of the National 
Center for Epidemiological Surveillance and 
Disease Control (CEVANECE) [Centro Nacional 
de Vigilancia Epidemiológica y Control de 
Enfermedades] it is those treated within the first 
48 hours who are most likely to recover. And 
according to the Director-General of the WHO, 
reducing the impact of the new influenza “will 
depend then on spotting an outbreak of human 
transmission quickly, and acting quickly” (39,46). 
For this reason, one of the main assumptions is 
that “actions must be taken,” regardless of whether 
the health sector has the necessary knowledge and 
means:
…we have to learn to face those risks despite 
all that we do not know [...] That means that we 
need to make decisions with knowledge and 
uncertainties of the scientific, technological 
and political order. For this reason, the need 
to apply the precautionary principle has been 
stressed in the field of environmental ethics 
for years. This principle states that the lack 
of certainty and scientific evidence regarding 
significant risks to health or the environment 
should not be an obstacle to putting into place 
precautionary measures that reduce risks and 
avoid possibly catastrophic consequences. In 
this regard, the precautionary measures taken 
in Mexico regarding the epidemic [...] were 
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adequate for the circumstances, when uncer-
tainty was prevailing. (47 p. 205-206) [Own 
translation]
A large part of these assumptions and the 
measures they implied lead us to accept that not 
only possibilities but also doubts and uncertainties 
are part of every action/research process. Doubts 
and uncertainties are inherent to scientific and 
technical actions, especially when they are applied 
to immediate and potentially dangerous processes. 
What is more, epidemiological knowledge is 
unsure about the course the new virus will take, 
that is, whether it will cause a demographic 
catastrophe or become another seasonal virus 
with low lethality. And it is according to these 
doubts that incorrect measures may be taken: “In 
1976, alter a small outbreak of swine influenza in 
Fort Dix, New Jersey, US public health officials 
persuaded the president Gerald R. Ford and 
the Congress to conduct a national vaccination 
campaign which ended up being the target of 
widespread criticism. However, 60 years before, 
an influenza virus which apparently started with a 
moderate outbreak in spring, reappeared months 
later to wreak havoc,” and the author wonders 
“what pattern will the influenza A (H1N1) follow? 
The only thing scientists can do is hope for the 
best and prepare for the worst” (6). The public 
health professionals that faced the new epidemic 
knew this then and they know this now.
Technical and scientific assumptions are 
not only theoretical assumptions, but also action 
guidelines that establish systems of expectations 
which are also subject to the evaluation and 
pressure that political power and businesspeople 
exert on the “decisions” of the health sector. This 
partly explains why authorities of the Secretariat of 
Health, despite accepting the possible existence of 
a new potentially lethal virus, decided to postpone 
– although for a short time – the national and 
international announcement that we were facing 
an epidemic caused by a new influenza – which, 
as we know, had already happened in Asian 
countries with SARS and avian influenza.
Along with these technical assumptions, there 
are a whole series of ideological assumptions 
imbued in the technical knowledge which 
appear to be decisive and of which to me the 
most significant are those “ideas and beliefs” 
that the health sector and biomedicine tend to 
hold regarding the population. These ideas and 
beliefs show distrust regarding the ways subjects 
behave, particularly in terms of prevention of the 
diseases from which they suffer and/or by which 
they are threatened. What is more, they deem the 
population to be reluctant to engage in prevention, 
failing to consult physicians or doing so too late, 
even when they suffer from a severe disease (48 
p.81), and tending to self-treat.Thus, for example, 
the Secretary of Health stated: “before April 17th, 
when the unusual growth in the number of cases 
of influenza was informed, patients had gone to 
hospitals only after 7 to 9 days of illness and with 
severe pneumonia symptoms. After that date, 
those affected began to go to the hospital 36 hours 
after the appearance of symptoms,” and he added: 
“that delay explains the high number of deaths 
between the ages of 20 and 39 years, along with 
the fact that this sector of the population tends to 
self-treat using medications that should only be 
taken under medical prescription” (49).
In addition, the health sector assumes 
that even if people have the right information 
regarding influenza or “unwanted pregnancies,” 
a part of the so-called “risk groups” do not take 
preventive measures. Moreover, they assume that 
the population relaxes preventive measures when 
they do not consider themselves to be in obvious 
danger, and, as stated above, that the population 
regards influenza as a mild cyclical condition 
they can self-treat. The name influenza evokes 
for them an ailment that returns year after year, 
with a level of danger far removed from severe 
conditions like HIV/AIDS, diabetes, or cancer. 
So for the population it is just another “flu”; they 
recognize the symptoms, and know that the 
effects only last for a few days and that there is 
a vaccine. They also know that the influenza can 
cause “complications” and even death. And they 
know this from experience, since most children 
suffer from influenza. The Mexican population 
has, in van Dijk’s words (50), an “information 
schema” regarding the causes, symptoms, 
severity, duration, and what has to be done in 
terms of self-medication and prevention, and it 
is with this collective knowledge that the health 
sector must work. For the population, influenza 
is not a “rare” or abnormal disease, so the health 
sector has to turn it into a severe, different and 
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“abnormal” disease and try to create notions of 
risk and danger so as to assert influence over the 
population. The health sector must also alarm the 
population because the new influenza did not 
occur in an information vacuum, but rather in 
2003 and 2005 the population had already been 
alerted to possible severe pandemics which did 
not have an impact in Mexico.
But the health sector also knows that different 
social sectors may oppose the preventive measures 
it will apply to face the pandemic: “One of the 
main obstacles faced in an influenza pandemic is 
the resistance of authorities from some sectors of 
government, as well as from other organizational 
levels” (15 p. 79). All pandemics will almost surely 
have economic consequences, and therefore, 
certain sectors of government and private 
companies may “resist” the application of some 
preventive measures. The health sector also knows 
that political opponents, critical intellectuals and 
alternative sectors will criticize and even oppose 
many of its actions, as in fact did occur.
Finally, we have to mention the assumptions 
the health sector holds regarding the media 
and the “alarmism” of which it was constantly 
accused. Thus, we have to accept what almost 
everybody acknowledges but which a part of 
the critics does not seem to accept in this case. 
We refer to the fact that the population is being 
increasingly bombarded by a constant mass 
of information it receives from different media 
sources, albeit traditional media related to word-of-
mouth communication, “modern” media like the 
printed press, radio or television, or postmodern 
media outlets like the Internet and increasingly 
sophisticated “smart” phones. This fact is added 
to the presence of information in the street as we 
walk or ride in public transportation or in our own 
vehicles. This exposure to information makes it 
so that if a piece of news must be “present” and 
impose itself, for market reasons or for reasons 
related to the prevention of the new influenza, 
campaigns including not only alarmism – and its 
variations in the media – but also other media-
based mechanisms to gain attention have to be 
developed, especially if the messages are meant to 
reach the maximum possible number of people in 
the shortest possible amount of time.
The official health sector needs, therefore, 
to involve the media in the dissemination of its 
objectives, and not just in situations of epidemics. 
It tries to use the media although it knows that the 
media may modify and distort the technical and 
scientific information received, prioritizing the 
spreading of information over possible distortions. 
In the case of epidemics, the health sector tries to 
immediately make the best use of mass media, 
since they are, according to specialists, the 
principal means of spreading information. And this 
is what the Mexican health sector did, especially 
during the first four weeks.
This use of the media should even serve as 
a mechanism to influence the political decisions 
of the Executive power, which are related not 
only to the acknowledgement of the problem 
faced and the actions taken to solve it, but also 
to the possibility of assigning the health sector 
the financial and human resources that make 
real action possible. Obviously, these relational 
strategies with the media are not only promoted 
by the official health sector, but also by the other 
social actors and, especially, by the so called non-
governmental organizations (NGO). The main 
media strategy “consists of a personalized and 
continuous relationship with the media, so that 
they receive and disseminate the information 
produced by a given institution, and also so that 
the media does not criticize – or criticizes as little 
as possible – the proposals and actions of these 
institutions” (38 p.61, 51) (d).
Therefore, the health sector acknowledges 
the importance of the media in spreading the 
information it wishes to circulate, and also has 
learned that the Internet can spread immediately – 
as never before – not only the information from the 
health sector, but also its concealments, distortions 
and mistakes. This means that individuals and 
groups can be publicly and almost instantly 
informed of the actions being taken, for example, 
by the health sector regarding the new influenza. 
For this reason the sector is almost forced to tell 
the truth, to acknowledge its mistakes and to 
engage in more transparent communication, 
which constitutes a new assumption for the 
health sector with respect to its course of action. 
As acknowledged in a recent study, the last 
epidemics have brought to light the systematic 
concealment of information on the part of national 
governments, despite international agreements 
regarding transparency; however, “since the SARS 
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outbreak, the world has seen substantial progress 
in transparency and rapid reporting” (53), as is 
known by the Mexican health sector.
There are two last assumptions which are 
more or less obvious. The first is that, according to 
the health sector, the management, the solution or 
at least the lessening of problems lies basically in 
biomedical knowledge and institutions. Although 
it acknowledges the importance of economic and 
political processes and actors, it considers that, 
whether or not resources suffice, it is biomedicine 
that can intervene most effectively. The second 
assumption is that the health sector acted the way 
it did because it was so planned by the WHO, 
the PAHO and the Mexican health sector itself, 
given that since 2005, in response to the avian 
influenza in 2003, the WHO has established rules 
and prepared documents to guide the actions to 
be taken in the event of an influenza pandemic (e).
In summary, we must accept that the 
Mexican health sector and its officials and 
experts, consciously and intentionally in most 
cases, worked with a series of technical and 
ideological assumptions which they applied 
systematically – and which included biases and 
mistakes as well as good decisions – because 
they considered the influenza a significant risk 
against which is was necessary to act despite 
their doubts and uncertainties. I consider that, 
based on the assumptions stated above, we can 
not only provide answers to many of the questions 
we raised initially, but we can also, above all, 
recognize the rationality employed by the health 
sector, aside from the accuracy or the error of their 
actions.
ASSUMPTIONS AND CERTAINTIES OF 
THE CRITICS
We can observe a second position with 
respect to the actions taken by the health sector, 
into which I will not delve particularly deeply, 
as most of its technical assumptions are, to some 
extent, shared by the critics. That is to say, critics, 
particularly those belonging to the biomedical 
field, have similar technical assumptions regarding 
a future catastrophic pandemic which is presumed 
to be the avian flu, as well as regarding the 
characteristics of the type A influenza, the lack 
of a specific vaccine, the need for “isolation” 
and hygiene measures, or the role of antivirals. 
Therefore, I will focus on the differential 
assumptions this tendency holds (f).
This second tendency is dominated by 
distrust and doubt regarding the actions not only 
of the Mexican health sector, but also of the 
WHO. It questions unnecessary alarmism and 
the consequences of the recommendations and 
preventive interventions. Several of the article 
authors ask: Why do they insist on blowing the 
epidemic out of proportion? Why did they scare 
people? Why do they keep applying economically 
harmful policies even after learning of the mild 
severity of the new influenza? And, of course: 
Why are more Mexicans dying? This last question 
that was not only asked at the beginning of the 
epidemic, but also after the outbreak of 2011-2012.
I wish to stress that these questions and a 
large amount of the criticism have to do not only 
with empirical data, but also with the techno-
scientific assumptions and politico-ideological 
assumptions held by those who question the 
actions taken by the health sector, the Mexican 
government, and the WHO. That is to say, in 
these tendencies there is a strong distrust of the 
technical capabilities of the officials in charge 
of health policies, a fact that was evidenced, 
for example, through the derogatory comments 
made by the rector of the Universidad Nacional 
Autónoma de México (UNAM) regarding the 
Secretary of Health, whom he ironically accused 
of practicing magical medicine (g), a criticism 
which outlasted the epidemic. So, when analyzing 
the new outbreak of influenza A (H1N1) during 
the winter of 2011/2012 in which there was a 
high number of cases, a news commentator wrote: 
“Health authorities remain silent, while every 
week the number of severely ill and dead rises,” 
and, regarding the suggestion of the Secretariat of 
Health that a possible explanation was that 89% of 
the deceased were not vaccinated, added:
In that case, why have biological agents been 
massively purchased, if in three years they 
have not been sufficiently applied? Is this 
an admission that vaccination campaigns 
are failing? [...] In my opinion, the vacci-
nation hypothesis is insufficient, as there are 
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countries with weaker health systems than 
that of Mexico which do not have such a 
noticeable presence of A (H1N1) [...] I hope 
the Secretariat of Health soon breaks its silence 
regarding this issue, which is so important to 
the health of Mexicans. (54) [Own translation]
These critics argue that the health sector, both 
at the National Secretariat level as well as at the 
state level, is headed by physicians who have no 
training in public health and have been appointed 
for political reasons. They also argue that the 
School of Public Health has not been training 
public health professionals but rather “so-called 
researchers.”
What predominates is not only distrust but 
also the lack of credibility of health sector officials 
and the government in general. Some critics have 
a baseline assumption that the sector is not only 
misinforming people but also hiding information, 
arguing that the Secretariat of Health spreads 
incorrect information with manipulative motives: 
“Since the authorities lack credibility, their 
incomplete and contradictory official statements 
are continuously challenged [...] Despite the 
number of the media and data transmission 
devices in existence, society is as ill-informed as it 
was 50 years ago” (55 p.71) (h).
Several authors argued that distrust and 
disbelief were present in every level of the Mexican 
society: “In Mexico there is a popular culture that 
does not believe the information that comes from 
government or science, but is willing to accept 
even the most unbelievable rumors” (47 p.212). 
However, and I reiterate, the distrust and the 
criticism is not only directed at the Mexican health 
system, but also at the WHO, which has been 
accused of lacking a global disease-fighting strategy 
capable of dealing with the current globalization 
processes (8,12), once again seen in the influenza 
A (H1N1) emergency. Beyond the criticism that 
may be formulated, we must acknowledge that 
the WHO and the regional offices planned and 
applied, in the case of influenza A (H1N1), a global 
action strategy. Recognizing this of course does not 
necessarily mean acknowledging it effectiveness, 
but rather questioning the assertion that there is a 
lack of planning globally. 
The assumption is that what is happening 
is the result of neoliberal policies which 
dismantled the institutions of the official health 
sector, especially the Mexican Institute of Social 
Security (IMSS) [Instituto Mexicano del Seguro 
Social]; and that investment, especially in primary 
healthcare, has been reduced. What occurred 
is largely attributed to the decentralization that 
has been applied in the health sector since the 
administration of Guillermo Soberón as Secretary 
of Health during the 1980s, and that has been 
reinforced by his successors, to the detriment of 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the Secretariat of 
Health. This strong assumption was especially put 
into evidence by the lack of information regarding 
the number of deaths registered in various states 
during the first weeks. This situation led the 
Secretariat of Health to send specialists to observe 
what was happening, and they detected that only 
four of the fifteen states studied complied with 
case notification regulations. The observers found 
“that following the orders of local Secretaries [of 
Health] or perhaps the governors themselves, 
those who compile the figures do not report 
deaths. ’They shave off cases [...] The reports 
sent from the states answer to local interests. It 
is shameful, and worst of all is that since they 
are decentralized they have no accountability,’ 
complained one of the appointed doctors who 
wishes to remain anonymous” (58 p.25). The 
article adds: “The compiled results did not surprise 
the appointed doctors: they are the symptoms of a 
badly implemented decentralization of the health 
system, of which the national state has washed its 
hands, and whose operation depends of governors 
who are accountable to nobody. Prior to the 
[influenza] crisis they did as they pleased” (58 
p.25).
The critics assume that the Mexican health 
system is characterized by frailty and vulnerability 
due to this decentralization, a consequence of 
neoliberal policies both in the health sector as 
well as in the politico-economic arena in general; 
burdens carried over from previous situations, like 
the eternal lack of funding of the official health 
sector; as well as frequent underspending in 
certain key areas. “The health emergency caused 
by human influenza exposed the feebleness of the 
national health system in successfully safeguarding 
the health of the population. Had the virus been of 
a higher lethality, it is unthinkable what costs to 
human life it would have caused” (59 p.1).
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Now, the most common questioning 
indicates the distracting effect that the actions 
taken against the new influenza had in Mexico, 
since they took over as the main concern of the 
media, overshadowing information on organized 
crime and the consequences of the strong 
economic crisis which began in 2008 in Mexico 
and that would have in 2009 the lowest economic 
and occupational indicators. A whole series of 
articles refer to this distracting effect, even in 
political terms; articles that express, for the most 
part, the point of view of the columnists and 
authors, but also the opinion of the population. 
So, for instance, a 29 year-old woman reported to 
one of the newspapers that she thought “that the 
virus did not exist, and that it was only a political 
distraction to divert our attention away from things 
happening in the government,” but clarified that 
“her perception changed” after she contracted 
influenza A (H1N1) and had to spend several days 
in the hospital (60).
For some analysts, this distracting effect might 
be related to the electoral campaigns that were 
to take place during the first trimester of 2009, 
when the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) [Instituto 
Federal Electoral], and not the government, 
became the sole administrator of media airtime, 
in such a way that “even the government would 
lose the only communication tool it had” (61). 
For this reason, the government had to legitimize 
itself through other means so as to influence the 
public opinion, which it would have been able to 
do by using the new influenza. According to polls 
conducted by the enterprise Parametría, president 
Calderón had an approval rating of 74% among 
Mexicans in 2009, which made some analysts 
conclude “it is evident that the management of the 
health emergency gave the head of state a boost in 
his approval rating” (62 p.117).
Several journalists and public health 
professionals stressed the role of fear as a means 
to control the population, as an instrument with 
which to divert attention from issues such as 
poverty, unemployment and insecurity, as well as 
to legitimize the government of president Calderón, 
who “has made use of several communication and 
propaganda strategies with the objective of reaching 
the popular consensus necessary to legitimize his 
rise to power; these strategies have taken into 
consideration the use of high-impact government 
actions, the management of moral panic and the 
use of a fear narrative” (62 p.71-72). An article 
reflecting on the constant threats imposed on us 
year after year by the WHO, the PAHO, the health 
sector and the media even proposes the existence 
of an “industry of pandemics.” The use of fear as 
a tool for social control is one of the hypotheses 
of social scientists, and forms part of the critics’ 
assumptions, however it would have to be shown 
that the population was indeed afraid. 
In addition to the criticisms of the health 
sector, the consequences of neoliberal policies on 
the sector, and the distracting effects of actions to 
combat the new influenza, we find a fourth line 
of questioning regarding the increase in poverty 
conditions and in socio-economic inequalities in 
Mexico which would produce a larger impact in 
the morbidity and mortality rates among the low-
income population in general, and in the poorer 
states in particular.
A fifth type of assumption is the one referring 
to the possibility of vaccines having negative 
consequences, based on the events following the 
type A influenza epidemic that took place in the 
United States in 1976 which caused hundreds of 
cases of Guillain-Barré syndrome, as well as the 
assumption that every vaccine needs a minimum 
amount of time for its quality and efficacy to be 
assured, whereas the one developed to fight the 
new influenza was made “in a rush.” This distrust 
regarding the consequences of vaccination 
was made evident by refusals to receive the 
vaccination not so much in the general population 
but rather among health personnel. Based on the 
analyzed information published between April 
and July 2009, but most of all between August 
and December 2009 and during 2010, 2011 
and 2012, it is evident that, in Mexico as well 
as in several other countries, part of the health 
personnel refused to get vaccinated, first against 
seasonal influenza and then particularly against 
influenza A (H1N1) once a specific vaccine was 
made available. They voiced several arguments, 
among them the side effects of the vaccines. In 
the case of Mexico, anti-vaccination behavior was 
not only noteworthy but also worrying, given that 
the Secretary of Health acknowledged on several 
occasions that during the epidemic only 60% of 
the health personnel was vaccinated against the 
new influenza.
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The main reason given to refuse the vaccine 
was, as we indicated previously, “fear of side 
effects,” which can be observed in several parts 
of the country: “At least 2500 physicians of 
Nuevo León refuse vaccination against influenza 
A (H1N1), as well as 600 doctors of the Aurelio 
Valdivieso Civil Hospital in the capital of Oaxaca, 
due to fear of the side effects of the immunization” 
(63). This reaction is attributed to the news about 
the consequences of the health of some doctors, 
which was spread “through the Internet, for several 
weeks, in an attempt to claim that the vaccine was 
dangerous” (63).
It was said, for example, that in a physician 
the vaccine produced “Guillain-Barré syndrome, 
an autoimmune condition which produces 
swelling, muscle weakness, and paralysis” (63); 
the public health authorities responded that this 
was “completely false information to which the 
nursing and medical personnel was exposed 
through magazines and the Internet” (63). The 
Secretary of Health later indicated that “so far only 
one case of Guillain-Barré syndrome associated 
with the application of the vaccine has been 
confirmed, which is not rare, considering the fact 
that the disease is present in the country with 
or without vaccination” (64). It is important to 
reiterate that, in the journalistic material consulted 
in this work, the information regarding the 
rejection of the vaccine is concentrated around 
the health personnel, with very few references to 
rejections by the population. 
However, the rejection of the vaccine by 
the Mexican health personnel is notable for two 
reasons: first, surveys of health personnel indicated 
that they were afraid of contracting influenza A 
(H1N1) (58,65); second, because despite the fact 
that the Secretariat of Health blamed rejection 
of the vaccine on the effect of internet rumors, 
even the most highly educated personnel decided 
against vaccination, according to certain more or 
less surprised specialists. And so, for example, in 
one of the most important Mexican centers for 
medical care and biomedical investigation – the 
National Nutrition Institute [Instituto Nacional 
de la Nutrición] – “it was not easy to get the 
health personnel vaccinated, since the rumors 
instilled fear even in members with high levels 
of formal education. And despite information 
and dissemination campaigns on safety, it was 
not possible to increase the vaccination rate” (3 
p.295).
Although the rejection of the vaccine was 
mostly generated through the Internet (i), the 
Secretary of Health said: “we were able to 
counter it effectively. We carried out a survey that 
indicated that 86% of people trust the vaccine.” 
And he reiterated the quality of the antigen: “of 
the 169 adverse reactions have been reported, 
101 correspond to the vaccine against the new flu, 
and none have been serious” (66). Nevertheless, 
the sense of distrust continued throughout the 
first months of 2010, and was put into words by 
a Senator of the Democratic Revolution Party 
(PRD) [Partido de la Revolución Democratica] and 
member of the Health Commission of the Senate 
of the Republic, who said that “he did not get 
vaccinated against influenza A (H1N1) because 
he did not trust the vaccine, and neither do the 
Mexican people” (66).
I believe it is important to stress that part 
of the health personnel refused the vaccine not 
only in Mexico, but also in the United States, 
Spain, Germany and other European and Latin 
American countries, which implies that there 
is distrust among the personnel in charge of the 
specific preventive measures. In the case of Spain, 
between 60% and 70% of the health personnel 
did not get vaccinated, which lead the Spanish 
public health authorities to threaten, in September 
of 2011, the imposition of economic sanctions 
on health professionals that refused vaccination 
against the new influenza.
The reasons given to refuse vaccination are 
not recent; they are in fact rather longstanding, 
which led to the formation in several countries 
of a true anti-vaccination movement among 
physicians and laypeople (67). This had a short-
lived presence in the Mexican media through the 
broadcasting of a video made by the physician 
and Benedictine nun Teresa Forcades, who 
“questions the effectiveness and safety of the 
vaccine and encourages people to reject it” (68), 
according to an assessment made two years after 
the impact of the epidemic and which indicates 
that Forcades’ thesis “generated controversy 
among epidemiologists and virologists,” going 
on to say that “the nun had her moment of glory, 
around the end of November 2009 in Barcelona, 
when she led the closing ceremony of the second 
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Congress of Science and Spirit [Congreso de 
Ciencia y Espíritu]. This Congress brought together 
conspiracy theorists, mystics, Bible scholars of the 
quantum era, as well as nature spirit visionaries 
and extraterrestrial masters” (68).
As we can see, in this account Forcades 
ceases to be a physician and is attacked as a nun, 
implying mystic and paranoid inclinations. But 
beyond these derogatory references, what I would 
like to stress is that not only the rejection but also 
the technical and politico-economic questioning 
of vaccination are part of the assumptions of a 
large sector of intellectual critics as well as health 
personnel, critical or not.
It seems to me that most of the critics’ 
assumptions – at least in the journalistic and 
biomedical material consulted in this research – 
operated in relation to the previously mentioned 
aspects, although I also found assumptions 
regarding other processes, albeit with less 
representation both in the press and in biomedical 
journals. One of them refers to the possible 
origin of the virus being the new methods for the 
production of pork, reinforced by the fact that the 
first confirmed case in Mexico was detected in 
a town close to one of the main pork producing 
facilities located in Perote (Veracruz) – Carroll 
Farms – and also by the fact that since 2007 the 
inhabitants of the communities at Perote have been 
denouncing the contamination generated by those 
farms, leading researchers to carry out studies that 
show an increase in acute respiratory diseases 
among this population. Within the epidemiological 
field people had been commenting that these new 
methods of production, especially of poultry and 
pork, constituted a fertile ground for the rise of 
new diseases, a hypothesis that indeed had been 
proposed a few years before as one of the possible 
causes of the avian flu epidemic.
According to some critics, studies performed 
between 1976 and 1989 showed that pigs in 
the United States were often infected with the 
H1N1 virus, but very rarely with the human virus 
H3 or the avian virus H1; moreover, between 
September 1997 and August 1998, 26 influenza 
viruses in pigs were isolated in the center and 
north of the United States, and all these samples 
were of the H1N1 virus. A scientific commission 
of Johns Hopkins University warned of the 
health hazard this type of exploitation posed. It 
is therefore important to mention that the journal 
Salud Pública de México near the end of 2009 
published an article by Charles W. Schmidt (69) 
which analyzes the role of the pork industry in the 
United States and other countries in the inception 
and spread of new influenzas. Schmidt indicates 
that, despite these accusations, the pork industry 
“fall[s] through regulatory cracks when it comes to 
sampling for novel viruses that could make people 
sick” and adds that influenzas “aren’t included 
on a list of 150 ‘reportable illnesses’ that, when 
detected, must be documented with the World 
Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). […] Novel 
H1N1 is also not required to be reported to OIE” 
(69 p.515-516).
Moreover, Schmidt adds that the lack of 
regulations is due in great part to the lack research 
studies showing the role of the pork industry in 
a series of environmental and human problems 
which, according to Robert Martin of Washington 
DC-based environmental group Pew, is largely 
owing to the collusion of industry and researchers. 
Martin states that “even the best scientists seem 
loathe to say anything against the industry,” 
because “with the decline in public research 
funding, it’s industrial animal agriculture that pays 
for virtually all the animal sciences research going 
on at land-grant universities today.” He concludes 
that “the research is biased to generate more 
industry profit. Many academic researchers are 
concerned about alienating their primary source 
of research dollars – i.e., the industrial animal 
sector – and that makes them leery of looking at 
industry problems with an open mind” (69 p.521). 
I stress that this work was published by Salud Pública 
de México, but without any commentary in that 
issue or any other issue of the journal; moreover 
I did not find any scientific article published by 
Mexican biomedical journals regarding this topic 
and the press did not report any concerns of the 
health sector regarding these possibilities, much 
less about the university research/pork industry 
collusion. According to the press, the only thing 
that seems to concern the health sector and the 
government are the economic consequences of 
the new influenza for the pork industry, and not 
the possible influence of the pork industry in the 
inception of influenza A (H1N1). I did not observe 
any information regarding the need for regulations 
or the taking of samples, and I was also unable to 
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find any information regarding regulations for the 
soft drink, alcohol or fast food industries.
Schmidt’s arguments relate to one of the 
consequences of the pandemic A (H1N1), and 
I refer to complaints about the ever-growing 
relationships between universities, researchers, 
high-level officials, the pharmaceutical-chemical 
industry, the WHO, and the health sector. These 
relationships are made evident in complementary 
ways ranging from the fact that a large amount of 
the funding for chemical research in American 
universities comes from the pharmaceutical-
chemical industry to the fact that more and more 
WHO high officials and consultants have worked 
or are currently working for this industry, which, 
in turn, pressures official and private medical 
institutions in different ways to buy certain 
medicines. However, this type of information 
was not present in the Mexican medical journals 
included in the corpus of this work, and while 
there are references in the Mexican press, such 
references are comparatively rare, although 
they not only indicated the main aspects of the 
problem, but they actually put it into evidence 
starting from the very first days after the 
declaration of the epidemic in Mexico. So, in a 
headline from April 23, 2009, La Jornada reports: 
“Pharmaceutical shares rise,” and indicates that 
“the threat of the pandemic of a new strain of flu 
which has taken the life of over 100 people in 
Mexico will be a relief for medicine and vaccine 
manufacturers. The Swiss Roche Holding AG and 
the British GlaxoSmithKline plc are the two largest 
pharmaceutical groups that can look forward to 
reaping the largest benefit from the situation, as 
governments and corporations order their Tamiflu 
and Relenza medicines” (70). The article goes on 
to report that the shares of both companies have 
risen, in response to which Jeff Holford, bank 
operation analyst, states that “there is certainly a 
perceived benefit and there probably will be some 
actual benefit, but not as much as the first time 
around with the avian flu” (70). 
The press also reported on antivirals 
and the relationships of the government with 
pharmaceutical-chemical companies. In June 
2010, La Jornada reported that the British Medical 
Journal had published articles in 2009 which 
showed that Roche laboratories had provided 
incomplete information on the antivirals they 
produce and hid their adverse effects, concluding 
that: “that neither their safety nor effectiveness can 
be assured” (71) and demanding that Roche make 
the information they have on those side effects 
public, while at the same time requesting that the 
European governments sue Roche. As we know, 
in 2010, the WHO added Tamiflu to the list of 
essential medicines to treat influenza.
Moreover, we noted the health authorities’ 
urgent demand for a new specific vaccine, a task to 
which several companies committed themselves 
as they rediscovered a new economic possibility 
that many other companies had forgone: “In the 
midst of the concern over the threat of an influenza 
epidemic, three large pharmaceutical companies 
announced acquisitions yesterday which give 
them rights over the new flu vaccines [...] The 
wave of transactions reflects the conviction of 
the pharmaceutical companies’ executives that 
vaccines against a multitude of ills will become 
a more important source of growth. Laboratories 
need to find new sources of income to replace 
successful medicines whose patents are near 
their expiration dates in the United States” (72). 
It is important to remember that vaccines cannot 
become generic, as happens with other medicines.
There is no doubt that a business based on 
illness and care/prevention exists which, in the 
case of the new influenza, requires urgency in 
researching, designing and producing the vaccines 
demanded by the public health authorities of most 
countries and by the WHO – a business controlled 
by private companies, which are largely subsidized 
by the governments. So, for instance, the company 
Novartis “received 289 million dollars from the 
Department of Health of the United States to 
ensure the development of clinical studies and the 
production of a vaccine against influenza” (73).
The pharmaceutical-chemical companies 
try to establish relations with different countries 
so as to place their products and, as an analyst 
indicates: “the competition among vaccine 
manufacturing laboratories [...] had a clear winner 
in the Mexican market. The government bought 30 
million vaccines for influenza A (H1N1) from the 
laboratories Sanofi Pasteur and GlaxoSMithKline, 
but Sanofi received the largest benefit, given that 
as of 2004 they have a signed agreement with 
the federal government regarding research and 
development for the production of vaccines in the 
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country in the event of an influenza epidemic” 
(74 p.72). Although everything indicates that the 
administration of Felipe Calderón miscalculated 
“the figures regarding the permanence and 
severity of the influenza A (H1N1)” and that is 
why they “signed a contract for 15 years to buy 
vaccines from the laboratory Sanofi Pasteur, an 
unjustified length of time, according to the analysis 
of the Federal Superior Auditor’s Office [Auditoría 
Superior de la Federación]” (75).
This is the national and international 
framework in which the chairman of the Health 
Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe, epidemiologist Wolfgang 
Wodarg, requested on January 12, 2010 that the 
WHO explain why the pandemic of influenza 
A (H1N1) was declared when its lethality was 
minimal, even lower than that of seasonal flu, and 
also denounced a group of people that work for 
the WHO as being closely associated with the 
pharmaceutical-chemical industry (76).
He considered that “the declaration of the 
pandemic and the urgent call for the production 
of a vaccine had the objective of benefiting the 
pharmaceutical laboratories” (77), after which the 
WHO “accepted submitting their procedures to 
the scrutiny of an external review commission and 
promised to reveal the results” (77).
That same day, the WHO reaffirmed that the 
pandemic was real, as up to that point there were 
more than 13 thousand confirmed deaths, stating 
“we have not exaggerated or underestimated the 
situation or the effects of the pandemic,” and 
also “rejected outright having been ‘influenced 
by commercial interests’” (78). Furthermore, the 
WHO would continue to deny the accusations, 
proposing the creation of a commission of external 
experts to evaluate its performance in dealing with 
the pandemic (79).
The discussion centered around three aspects: 
the influence of the pharmaceutical-chemical 
companies in the decisions of the WHO, whether 
an A (H1N1) pandemic really existed, and the 
possible negative consequences of vaccination; 
but given that the latter was already discussed, 
we will focus on the first two aspects. During the 
first half of 2010, the press kept reporting on these 
aspects and, especially, on the team that would 
evaluate the actions of the WHO, given that 
accusations would damage the WHO’s image not 
only with the scientific community but also with 
the population, who might “reject the vaccine 
and endanger their health and their lives, said 
the vice president of the Health Committee of 
the Council of Europe” (79). However, criticism 
was leveled not only at the WHO, but also at the 
agencies and European governments which were 
accused of “exaggerating the public health risks 
of the influenza A (H1N1), and making decisions 
in secret which benefited the pharmaceutical 
companies” (80).
However, both the criticisms and the defenses 
continued: a “text elaborated by the British Medical 
Journal and the Bureau of Investigative Journalism 
[...] questions the secrecy surrounding the identity 
of the members of the council which a year ago 
recommended declaring the first pandemic of the 
century due to influenza A (H1N1)” (81). This 
research study found that three of the experts 
who elaborated an action plan in the case of a 
possible pandemic of influenza had economic 
ties to the pharmaceutical-chemical industry, and 
that other researchers who recommended the use 
of antivirals to face the epidemic also received 
money from the manufacturing companies of these 
drugs. Despite that “the WHO did not reveal these 
conflicts of interests [...] The report also questions 
the secrecy regarding the influenza experts who 
formed the Emergency Group that recommended 
the Director-General of the WHO to declare, on 
June 11, 2009, the influenza A (H1N1) pandemic” 
(81,82). This led the WHO to make, on August 
11, 2010, the names of the fifteen members of 
the Emergency Committee public. It was thereby 
confirmed that five of these experts “were paid 
by the industry, but the WHO stressed that at no 
point were there any conflicts of interests which 
would affect the autonomy of the specialists” (81).
In Mexico, opinions were divided; on the one 
hand, the Secretary of Health “rejected the criticism 
the European Community made against the WHO 
regarding the exaggeration of the response against 
the influenza A (H1N1) pandemic and denied that 
pharmaceutical companies pressured Mexico into 
acquiring vaccines [...] He considered that there 
were no grounds to say that the WHO exaggerated 
when the corresponding regulations had been 
approved since 2005 and, in that sense, the steps 
of the care and prevention plan for the pandemic 
were those that every country in the world had 
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established” (83). He emphasized that “we were 
not pressured by the laboratories,” and that the 
criticism was possibly due to the fact that “some 
countries acquired not 100 percent, but rather 
200 percent” (83). Whenever there are problems, 
especially economic problems, as in this case, 
buying double the number of vaccines and 
then not being able to use them creates certain 
discomfort and criticism, but that is another matter. 
The Secretary of Health had stressed that the steps 
followed were the steps all member countries of 
the WHO had agreed upon: “I don’t know why 
now some believe they have been tricked, when 
it was their own experts who took part in the 
creation of the regulations for the steps outlined in 
the case of a pandemic” (83).
Conversely, Asa Cristina Laurel, Health 
Secretary of the “legitimate government” of 
Andres Manuel López Obrador (j), “said that 
one of the main consultants of the WHO, 
doctor Albert Osterhaus, is clearly associated 
with pharmaceutical laboratories [...] Osterhaus 
supported the declaration of the pandemic and the 
urgency of producing the vaccine. The problem 
with this man, nicknamed Dr. Flu, is that there are 
clues pointing to the relationship he has with the 
pharmaceutical laboratories” (77).
Research studies and considerations of the 
role of the pharmaceutical-chemical industry and 
its relationships with the official and private health 
sectors, the WHO and the universities have a long 
history, as do the role of high-level officials in these 
type of corrupt relationships. This industry uses 
every means available to push its products, and is 
the main supporter of what is known as “disease 
mongering” (84,85). We need to recognize that 
“Big Pharma [...] is the most profitable industry in 
the USA and the most powerful lobby on Capitol 
Hill. According to Marcia Angell, of Harvard 
Medical School, the ten biggest pharmaceutical 
companies – which are among the Fortune 500 
of 2006 – receive more benefits than all the other 
490 companies” (8 p.161). The pharmaceutical-
chemical industry employs any tactic at its 
disposal, especially corruption, so, for instance, 
the company GlaxoSmithKline plc has been 
investigated by the US Department of Justice for 
allegedly illegal marketing of their antidepressants 
and other medicines. In 2012, the company 
admitted to having carried out illegal marketing, as 
well as hiding biosecurity data from US regulatory 
bodies, for which it had to pay three billion dollars, 
“an amount that the Department of Justice deemed 
to be the largest settlement for health fraud in the 
history of the USA.” Nevertheless, the company 
continues to face other accusations, as its frauds 
continue both within and outside the USA (86).
In the case of Mexico, not only during 
this epidemic, but especially during the bird 
flu epidemic, the health sector was accused of 
unnecessarily buying large quantities of antivirals 
(38). And, in the case of the WHO, some of the 
strongest criticism was and still is directed at the 
changes made to the definition of pandemic in 
May 2009 which helped the WHO to turn, in June 
of this year, the influenza A (H1N1) outbreak into 
a pandemic. To that end, the WHO removed as 
a requirement for the declaration of a pandemic 
the existence of the mortality of a large part of the 
population so as to be able to establish a phase 6 
alert. Before this modification, in order to be able 
to declare a pandemic there had to be a mortality 
rate higher than the average mortality rate caused 
by the seasonal influenza, which in the case of 
influenza A (H1N1) did not happen. According to 
Forcades, this change in the regulations “allow[s] 
so-called ‘pandemic vaccines’ to be patented and 
the companies holding these patents to negotiate 
binding pre-contracts with the governments of 
WHO member countries, at monopoly prices 
and with as many secret clauses as deemed fit. 
These pre-contracts come into effect automatically 
the moment a phase 6 global pandemic alert is 
declared” (87 p.246).
Now, these facts and interpretations must 
be analyzed within a particular context, in which 
the relationships of this industry with Mexican 
biomedicine are characterized by a suspicion that 
everyone seems to have but no one researches. 
And so, a renowned researcher from the National 
Institute of Respiratory Disease (INER) [Instituto 
Nacional de Enfermedades Respiratorias] poses, 
as an important area for journalistic investigation, 
the “possible cases of corruption that may exist in 
Mexico with pharmaceutical companies. It is clear 
that certain clinics tend to use drugs of a certain 
pharmaceutical company more widely,” and he 
asks himself: “Has there been any journalistic 
research which has documented or refuted that 
rumor, so present among physicians and health 
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institutions?” (88 p.7). It is important to indicate 
that these processes are not “researched” by 
journalists, as the author indicates critically, but 
they are also not studied by researchers, critical or 
not. However, strong assumptions exist regarding 
the ways the pharmaceutical-chemical industry 
acts and its economic relationships with the health 
sector, the WHO and researchers (k).
Another assumption, employed both 
by the health sector and the critics, refers to 
scientific research and the pharmaceutical-
chemical industry, and has to do with the fact 
that the viruses “invented” or redesigned by the 
researchers, whether intentionally or through 
human error, have serious consequences 
for health, even at a pandemic level. This 
expectation appears multiple times in the press 
and in scientific publications: “The journals 
Nature and Science published the names of 
the scientists of an international group which 
will induce controlled changes on the avian flu 
virus H7N9 hoping to create an efficient vaccine 
to combat the strain, as well as to learn if its 
transmission to other organisms is possible.” The 
article continues: “The researchers emphasize 
that all this will be done under the most extreme 
scientific biosecurity protocols and the possible 
risks arising from the handling of virus will be 
kept to a minimum” (89). A group of twenty-two 
scientists headed by Ron Fouchier will create 
mutations of the virus A-H7N9 to increase its 
virulence, so as to generate biological agents 
that make it possible to fight serious pandemics. 
The researchers believe that nature is the biggest 
threat, and not what they do in the laboratory, 
since they work under the highest biosecurity 
levels possible (90).
However, while these researchers perform 
this type of studies believing they control all 
possible risks, critics argue that a large part of the 
risks created by these research studies cannot be 
controlled.
Finally, there are assumptions which at 
least a part of the critics hold regarding the mass 
media and its use by the health sector, which 
include the accusation that the Mexican health 
sector lacked a planned communication policy 
regarding the new influenza. Communication 
specialists, anthropologists and researchers of the 
medical field accused the media of twisting reality 
and providing incorrect and biased facts (91,92), 
questioning not only the alarmist uses of language 
but also the slant. In previous works (38,93) I 
reviewed the opinion the critics have of the media, 
which may be summarized in the following 
statements: a) they twist the facts, including what 
social actors do and say; b) they hide information, 
slant the information obtained, misinform more 
than inform; c) they have a tendency not only 
towards alarmism and sensationalism but also 
towards catastrophism; d) they try to present the 
information as a spectacle and in a sensationalist 
way, so that every day there is more information 
but we do not know what it means; e) they 
stigmatize and exclude certain social actors; f) 
the information is characterized by its focus on 
the present and ahistoricity, concerned only with 
“novelties”; g) the information is unintelligible 
and, often, chaotic; h) the media do not include 
the structural causes of the processes they report 
on, but rather try to hide such causes; i) they do 
not present contextual data regarding the place 
in which the facts they report on happen; j) they 
express economic and political interests; k) they 
try to divert the eyes of the public away from 
the serious, structural and immediate problems, 
and direct them to secondary problems; l) the 
information is characterized by its uniformity.
Moreover, the majority of the critics believe 
that the media are all-powerful, and even for 
authors that hold Baudrillard’s ideology (94), the 
media are the current creators of “reality.” 
This reading of the media was paradigmati-
cally expressed during the outbreak of the new 
influenza through the statements of Mark Siegel, 
professor at the New York University School 
of Medicine. In a text disseminated widely 
throughout the world and especially in Mexico, 
he argues that although the measures taken by the 
Mexican health sector were generally correct (95 
p.9), given the low lethality of the new virus, the 
way of informing the public was largely alarmist. 
He denounces the way in which the health sector 
and the media exaggerated the problem and 
comes to the conclusion that the strongest virus 
was not the flu, but rather the fear induced by the 
media. For Siegel, as well as many other critics, it 
was above all a media pandemic.
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SOME ARTICULATING REFLECTIONS 
There is no doubt that many of the assump-
tions of the health sector are correct, as are many 
of the assumptions of the critics, like those which 
refer to the effect of the neoliberal policies in the 
dismantling of certain basic institutions of the 
Mexican health sector, especially the Mexican 
Institute of Social Security, the disappearance of 
national laboratories of biological products, as 
well as the negative effects of the decentralization 
that contributed to reduce the effectiveness of the 
official health sector. Other factors that had and 
still have a negative effect are the increase in the 
poverty levels and socio-economic inequalities, as 
well as the effect of corruption at local government 
level, and the “dangerous relationships” between 
the pharmaceutical-chemical industry, researchers 
and health institutions. However, other assump-
tions of the critics are dubious or simply incorrect, 
like those referred to the little consequences of 
the influenza A (H1N1) in terms of morbidity and 
mortality, the negative effects of the vaccine, the 
alleged role played by the fear generated by the 
health sector, the lack of techno-scientific aptitude 
of the health care team that planned and acted 
against the new influenza or the lack of a com-
munication strategy (1).
In the technical and ideological assumptions 
stated above, the techno-ideological rationality 
applied by the Mexican health sector is established, 
especially if we regard uncertainty as an essential 
part of that rationality. Therefore, the actions taken 
by the health sector, regardless of their efficiency, 
are part of a techno-ideological way of thinking 
and acting in response to a pandemic emergency, 
which cannot be wholly discredited due to errors, 
omissions, corrupt collusions, or collusions of 
any other type, but which should be understood 
as a whole and situationally before formulating 
criticism. From this perspective, a great number 
of assumptions in terms of the epidemiological 
rationality applied are legitimate not only 
among the health sector, but also among of the 
critics, although fundamentally in economic 
and political terms, since part of their technical 
as well as some of their economic and political 
questionings do not withstand comparisons with 
empirical data.
We refer, for example, to assumptions and 
assertions on the role of the swine farms in the 
appearance of the new virus in Mexico, to the 
lack of a planned communication strategy to face 
influenza A (H1N1), to the negative consequences 
of vaccines, and, especially, to considering the 
new epidemic as exclusively media-related given 
the limited impact it may have had in mortality, 
which, as we know, was the central point of the 
criticism.
Several studies have revealed that the health 
sector employed a planned risk communication 
strategy (96,97), but above all statistical information 
has shown that mortality due to the new influenza 
was much higher than what was indicated by the 
critics and even higher than what was estimated 
by the WHO. According to the WHO there might 
have been 18,400 deaths attributed to the new 
influenza, but in mid-2012 The Lancet published 
an article (98) in which authors review worldwide 
data and conclude that during that time period, 
between 151,700 and 575,400 people died due 
to the A (H1N1) pandemic, 51% of which were 
in Asia and Africa. This information radically puts 
into question the arguments that considered the 
pandemic a mere media creation related to the 
WHO and the Mexican health sector. Not only 
have the critics once again hastened to criticize, 
but the fact that they reduced their interpretations 
to statistical data from Mexico and the “western 
world” evidences their obvious ethnocentrism.
This higher than expected impact evidences 
what the WHO, the Mexican health sector and 
also the critics had coincidentally suggested: 
that the new influenza would have its principal 
impact in terms of mortality in those countries 
with health systems characterized by their 
debility and lack of resources. Therefore, what 
happened with the health systems of African and 
Asian countries legitimizes the predictions of the 
WHO, not for a single country but for a globalized 
pandemic which, in terms of health-disease-care-
prevention processes (HDCP processes), tends 
to affect primarily the poorer countries with less 
medical and health care infrastructure. What 
influenza A (H1N1) evidenced once more is that 
the HDCP processes usually act as spies into the 
contradictions of a social system or of a health 
care technical apparatus but also, as in this case, 
of their critics (l).
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As often happens, in light of the actions taken 
against influenza A (H1N1) different points of view 
are expressed by the social actors involved (37). 
These actors, based on similar epidemiological 
assumptions, suggest different interpretations 
regarding the HDCP processes triggered by the 
emergency and the spread of the new influenza 
and, especially, regarding the way the health 
sector acted. The emergence of different points of 
view is not only normal but also necessary; on the 
one hand such difference expresses uncertainty 
and doubts regarding the scientific approach, 
while, on the other hand, it evidences the politico-
economic and cultural-ideological dimensions of 
knowledge processes. Such processes tend not 
only to act but also intervene directly in social 
reality, regardless of how technical and scientific 
their proposals and actions are. All knowledge is 
ideologized and politicized, at least at the moment 
of its application and intervention.
Faced with the existence of different and 
even opposed interpretations, we can – from a 
scientific and/or knowledge perspective – adopt 
different positions. The first position, which until 
recent times was dominant in some intellectual 
spheres, refers to the post-structuralist and 
Foucaultian proposals which assume expressly 
or implicitly that in every significant process 
there are different points of view, such that the 
problem of considering “the” truth is secondary, 
since the truth is only a result of power. Therefore, 
in the case of influenza A (H1N1), “the” truth is 
imposed by the WHO, the Secretariat of Health, 
the pharmaceutical-chemical industry and other 
actors involved in the application of this truth. That 
is, we are not only facing gnoseological relativism, 
but also an exclusion of the transactional processes 
that include the subordinate and non-subordinate 
sectors in the development of “resistances” 
and, especially, in the development of counter-
hegemonic actions and proposals, regardless of 
whether power imposes itself.
A second possibility would be to acknowledge 
the existence of different and even contradictory 
points of view, whose differentiation lies basically 
in the economic and political dimension and, 
to a lesser extent, in the ideological dimension, 
leading to conclusions similar to those of the 
previous proposal, since the conception with a 
greater political and economic power represented 
by the social actors mentioned above would be 
imposed. Although this tendency does not deny 
the matter of truth, or set it out in relativistic terms, 
its conclusions are similar to the previous one (m).
There is a third possibility – and there are 
obviously others – which acknowledges that 
although “the” truth tends to be constructed 
and imposed in terms of power, in economic 
and political terms or in terms of knowledge, it 
does not exclude the need and the possibility to 
find true explanations – or at least truer – of the 
process or problem posed. Moreover, it questions 
reducing “truth” to power, economic and political 
or knowledge-related dimensions, proposing an 
analysis of the specific processes with respect 
to the present situation but also throughout a 
historical period which makes it possible to 
analyze the tendencies that took place not only 
regarding the assumptions of the different social 
actors but also the transactions that take place 
among them. And, obviously, reality should not 
be reduced exclusively to the point of view – or, 
if you prefer, to the power – of only one of the 
social actors.
A great part of the assumptions employed 
by the Mexican health sector are true, as are a 
great part of the assumptions held by the critics; 
but regardless of the role played by the economic 
interests of the pharmaceutical-chemical industry 
or the political objectives of the Mexican 
government, we observe that the health sector not 
only acted with technical rationality but also had 
as a main objective the reduction of the negative 
effects in terms of morbidity and mortality of the 
new influenza, which, as we know, constitutes 
its specific objective. These statements do not 
ignore that on top this primary objective – as 
always or at least frequently occurs – economic, 
political and ideological objectives of the 
abovementioned social actors have been added, 
actors that include the health sector itself, which – 
as we have persistently analyzed – constitutes an 
inherent part of the functions of the Hegemonic 
Medical Model (HMM) (99,100). For this reason, 
from our methodological perspective (37,101), 
we consider it necessary not only to take into 
account the structure and the functions of the 
HMM in order to explain the rationality employed 
by the WHO and the Mexican health sector, 
but also to try to analyze the processes in terms 
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of contradictory and controversial articulations, 
which are also complementary and not simply 
polarized oppositions. These articulations may 
make it possible to detect “truth effects,” but 
without accessing the truth of the processes we try 
to understand and possibly modify. 
From this perspective, doubts and uncertainties 
are an essential part of the epidemiological 
rationality, given the need of the health sector to 
act in epidemic processes. And this “discovery,” 
along with the inclusion of the characteristics and 
functions of the HMM, is precisely part of that truth.
ENDNOTES
a. Between April 24, 2009 and June 31, 2009, 
179 articles authored by prominent Mexican in-
tellectuals were published by the newspapers La 
Jornada and Reforma.
b. Although I propose two groups, I consider 
there to be a range of intermediate possibilities, 
as revealed in our analysis of the journalistic 
and biomedical information about influenza A 
(H1N1) (1). Both groups are formed as follows: 
health sector: Secretary of Health, senior officials 
of the WHO and the PAHO, Mexican experts on 
infectious and contagious diseases, the Mexican 
president; critics: Mexican and foreign critical 
biomedical analysts, Mexican intellectuals, politi-
cians opposed to the government, media experts, 
social scientists specialized in health-disease-care-
prevention processes. Let me clarify that within 
both groups there are different orientations but, 
for the purposes of this study, that is secondary 
and irrelevant. 
c. See the articles published in La Jornada and Re-
forma between April, 24 and July, 31 of 2009.
d. In addition, these policies can fabricate epi-
demics, or at least exaggerate problems, as was 
the case of a crack epidemic widely disseminated 
in an alarmist way by the media and specialized 
Brazilian agencies. A study (52) later revealed that 
this epidemic did not exist and concluded that 
such epidemic alarmism possibly sought to obtain 
more resources for anti-drug activities. 
e. Starting in 1999, the WHO created documents 
which were reviewed and updated according to 
the new experiences, as occurred in 2005 and 
2009.
f. In our analysis of the articles published by La 
Jornada and Reforma, we obsered that 72.5% of 
those articles criticize the Mexican health sector, 
while 47% note positive aspects. In the case of the 
156 headlines that both newspapers published be-
tween April 22, 2009 and May 18, 2009, we found 
19 critical headlines and 3 supporting the health 
sector (1). Criticism leveled at the health sector is 
much rarer in Mexican biomedical journals than 
in the written press; in the latter articles appear re-
ferring to American and European research studies 
and publications which question the actions of the 
WHO and the health sector that were not present 
in the Mexican biomedical publications, despite 
coming from well-known scientific journals.
g. The rector of the UNAM mocked the Secretary 
of Health of Mexico after a press conference in 
which the Secretary criticized the use of neckties, 
touting them to be a virus reservoir.
h. A study on the faculty and students of the Uni-
versidad de Guadalajara concluded that the par-
ticipants of the study distrusted the information 
propagated by the authorities and the media (56). 
A study carried out among the faculty and students 
at UNAM found that 23% of those interviewed 
said the new virus was the product of political ma-
nipulation or a fraud, while 17% thought it was 
the product of genetic engineering and human in-
tervention (57).
i. The role of the Internet in the spread of negative 
rumors has been documented in several countries 
and, especially, in the United States; a research 
study noted a high rate of correlation among neg-
ative messages, geographical area and vaccination 
coverage (53).
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j. Andres Manuel López Obrador (also known 
as AMLO) was a candidate for the presidency of 
Mexico supported by the Democratic Revolution 
Party, who lost in the elections due to the noto-
rious fraud perpetrated in favor of the candidate 
for the National Action Party. AMLO kept, for 
several years, a parallel cabinet, of which Cristina 
Laurell was part.
k. The press reports some critical aspects, re-
garding for example the pharmaceutical-chemical 
industry, which do not appear in Mexican medical 
journals. Even when well-regarded researchers 
denounce the role of the industry, their remarks 
appear in the press and not in biomedical journals, 
at least in the case of influenza A (H1N1).
l. The greater impact of this new influenza in pe-
ripheral countries characterized by weak health 
systems reveals the contradictions of capitalism at 
a global level but, at the same time, evidences the 
feebleness, haste, ahistoricity and unilateralism of, 
at least, one part of the critics.
m. I believe that a whole series of Marxists became 
Foucaultian for two main reasons: both schools 
of thought excluded the role of the subject and 
both, consciously or not, sought – and still seek – 
unicausal determinisms which, for some, refer to 
“power” and for others, to the economic and po-
litical dimension.
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